This study examines the extent to which pay-for-performance incentive contracting is used in the nonprofit setting. Starting with the premise that nonprofits have as an objective expenditures on charitable output, we show that nonprofit CEO compensation is a function of accounting-based performance metrics reflecting provisions of resources for charitable spending; that is, revenues and increases in net assets. We show that nonprofits place positive incentive weights on all but one category of revenues, and that these weights vary with the degree of goal congruence of the revenue sources. That is, we find no incentive weight on unrelated taxable revenues, a modest weight on unrelated tax-exempt revenues, and the largest weights on the tax-exempt revenue categories most congruent with the charitable mission. We also find that, on average, nonprofits place positive incentive weight on increases in net assets, suggesting that they forego current expenditure on charitable output in order to secure financial viability and provide for capital needs in future periods. As predicted, however, we show that incentive weights on net assets vary across nonprofits to reflect the unique economic conditions each faces. Specifically, we show decreased weights for nonprofits with excessive endowments, and increased weights for nonprofits with subsequent significant capital expenditures. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ We greatly appreciate the feedback from workshop participants at
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of our study is to empirically examine the extent to which CEO compensation is associated with accounting-based performance metrics in the nonprofit setting, and how institutional features affect that association. While the accounting literature is replete with analytic and archival studies examining the use of accounting-based performance metrics for CEOs compensation of for-profit organizations, there is comparatively little research in the nonprofit setting.
1 Extending this line of inquiry to the nonprofit setting is important because of the large and expanding role of nonprofits in the US economy (i. Four prior studies (Baber et al. 2002; Brickley and Van Horn 2002; Frumkin and Keating 2010; Aggarwal et al. 2012) provide empirical evidence of the relation between various accounting-based performance metrics and nonprofit executive compensation. We contribute to this research in several ways. To begin with, we are the first study to disaggregate total revenues into its various components and test for differences in incentive weights across revenue sources. Baber et al. (2002) and Aggarwal et al. (2012) examine metrics derived from total revenues, implicitly constraining the coefficient on the various revenue sources to be constant, while Frumkin and Keating (2010) focus narrowly on donations revenues. While Baber et al. (2002) and Aggarwal et al. (2012) document a positive association between compensation changes and total revenue changes, Frumkin and Keating (2010) find no association between compensation and donations. These contrasting results suggest that incentive weights vary across nonprofit revenue sources, a conjecture that has not yet been tested. We extend the literature by not only investigating the association between executive compensation and each of the nonprofit revenue sources, but also by testing predictions regarding differences in incentive weights based on Feltham and Xie's (1994) construct of performance measure congruity.
In addition, we extend Brickley and Van Horn's (2002) examination of the association between compensation and the change in net assets (the nonprofit analog to net income) for nonprofit hospitals (comprising only five percent of all nonprofits) to educational institutions and charitable organizations. We further contribute to this line of inquiry by examining whether the incentive weight on net assets depends on the presence of excessively large endowments that exacerbate the agency problem (c.f., Core et al. 2006) or on future capital investment needs. This is an important line of inquiry because of the complex role that net assets play in the nonprofit setting. In the for-profit setting, a manager's incentive with respect to net income is typically hypothesized to be positive. In the nonprofit setting whether net assets will be positively or negatively incentivized is unclear; while accumulating additional net assets will increase financial stability, it necessitates postponing charitable output. Our study is the first to provide evidence regarding variation in the incentive weight on net assets.
To test our hypotheses we regress disaggregated measures of nonprofit revenues and change in net assets on executive compensation. We disaggregate total revenues into its constituent components of donations, program service revenues (from the sales of products and services), interest revenues, other revenues, unrelated exempt revenues (tax-exempt revenues from sidebusiness activities), and unrelated taxable revenues (taxable revenues from side-business activities). We find that managers are incentivized to increase all revenue sources with the exception of unrelated taxable revenues, and that the incentive weights statistically vary consistent with differences in performance measure congruence. Specifically, we find the largest incentive weights for revenues that are comparatively more consistent with the charitable mission (i.e., donations and program service revenues) and the smallest incentive weights for the least mission consistent forms of revenues (i.e., unrelated exempt revenues and unrelated taxable revenues). These results provide the first evidence that nonprofit incentive compensation schemes reflect differences in performance measure congruence consistent with predictions of agency theory (i.e., Feltham and Xie 1994) .
Turning to our analyses of the change in net assets, we predict and find a positive incentive weight on change in net assets, controlling for the incentive weights on revenue components.
This result extends those of Brickley and Van Horn (2002) to a larger population of nonprofits.
We further predict and find a smaller incentive weight on change in net assets in the presence of excess endowments, providing the first evidence that nonprofit compensation contracts are used to mitigate the excess endowment agency costs documented by Core et al. (2006) . We also predict and find a stronger incentive weight on change in net assets in anticipation of future capital investments, providing the first evidence that nonprofit compensation contracts are used to incentivize the accumulation of funds for a specific purpose.
Overall our results suggest that nonprofit incentive compensation contracts are more sophisticated than prior research seems to suggest, with incentive weights reflecting differences in performance measure congruity, excess endowments, and future investment needs. In addition, our study provides a more comprehensive response to calls for research aimed at providing a better understanding of the objective functions and incentive compensation strategies of nonprofits (Brickley and Van Horn 2002) .
In the following section, we discuss the background, followed by theory and hypothesis development. Following sections describe the data and research design and present the results of our analysis. The final section concludes.
II. BACKGROUND The Nonprofit Agency Problem and the Demand for Incentive-Based Contracts
Nonprofit organizations are subject to state and federal laws, both of which specify that nonprofits' primary objective be the accomplishment of their specific charitable purpose (Fremont-Smith 2004; IRS 2011) . Although these legal requirements suggest that nonprofits are required to deploy their assets in the provision of a specific charitable output, nonprofits are managed by individuals whose own best interests might not always align with maximizing charitable output. In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the agency problem that comes with a separation of ownership from control, and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) extend this theory to nonprofits by noting the separation of decision rights by management and the bearing of risk by donors, grantors, and the state. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that agency costs exist in the nonprofit setting; Core et al. (2006) find that large endowments lead to higher managerial salaries, consistent with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, and Du Bois et al. (2004) provide evidence that agency costs, measured by the level of director compensation, give rise to greater levels of "disliked" unrelated taxable revenues. Incentive compensation is frequently proffered to reduce these agency costs.
While incentive contracts can reduce agency costs, nonprofits are subject to unique institutional features that may limit the use of such contracts. First, Internal Revenue Code (hereafter, IRC) section 501(c)(3), 4941, and 4958 and state laws permit any organization whose primary purpose is religious, educational, medical or charitable to claim a tax-preferred nonprofit status, so long as its earnings do not inure to "disqualified" persons and upon liquidation all net assets flow to another nonprofit; that is, there can be no 'private inurement' (Hansmann 1980; Rose-Ackerman 1996) . These prohibitions have been referred to collectively as the 'nondistribution constraint' (Hansmann 1980) , and violation is grounds for penalties or, in the extreme, loss of nonprofit status. 2 Excessive compensation, which includes excessive bonuses, is considered to be a violation of this provision. In order to avoid being classified as "excessive,"
an incentive bonus must be reasonable under Treasury Regulation 53.4958-6. In general, these regulations require that a bonus be approved by the nonprofit's board in advance of payment and be directly linked to specific measurable outcomes. These legal requirements could reduce the use of incentive compensation in the nonprofit setting.
Second, while in for-profit firms over 95 percent of executive compensation is equity-based (Murphy 1999 (Murphy , page 2529 , nonprofits have no ability to grant executives a share of residual claim to the organization's assets as a source of incentive pay. Moreover, without an openlytraded stock price, nonprofits lack a single sufficient statistic of performance on which to base pay-for-performance compensation.
Finally, research suggests that, in contrast to managers of for-profits, managers of nonprofits may choose to forego wealth utility in favor of the utility they gain from accomplishing a charitable mission, which might impact the use of nonprofit incentive based compensation (Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999) . Stewardship theory in the management literature pushes this idea further and allows for an alternative view of managerial behavior in that it "defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals" (Davis et al. 1997, p. 21) . To the extent that steward CEOs self select into nonprofit organizations and derive significant utility from non-monetary rewards, the agency conflict is to some extent mitigated (Caers et al. 2006; Puyvelde et al. 2012) . To the extent nonprofit managers exhibit the traits described under stewardship theory, the need for incentive compensation contracts will be weakened.
In sum, although it is probable that agency conflicts exist in the nonprofit setting and that incentive compensation contracts can help mitigate those conflicts, institutional features and constraints may restrict the ability or willingness of nonprofit organizations to engage in such contracts. Thus the extent to which incentive compensation is used in nonprofit organizations is an empirical question.
The Prevalence of Nonprofit Executive Compensation Contracts
According to a survey by The American Society of Association Executives, over 75 percent of nonprofits offer incentive bonuses to their CEOs, suggesting that bonuses are a very common source of nonprofit incentive remuneration. On average, CEOs in the study received a bonus of $33,811, representing roughly 16 percent of average pre-bonus salary.
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We obtain additional, anecdotal evidence from our discussions with two individuals who own and operate nonprofit compensation consulting firms. The consultants stated that the typical incentive contract is a year-end bonus tied to specific and measurable performance outcomes and paid prior to the year end so that the payment occurs in the same period as the performance. The consultants recommend that their clients use a fairly small number of performance metrics (two to four) and that the metrics are roughly an equal combination of financial and non-financial 
Prior Literature
Baber et al. (2002) empirically examine the use of accounting-based metrics in nonprofit chief executive officer (CEO) compensation with a sample of 331 nonprofits over a two-year period.
Beginning with the fundamental proposition that nonprofits will incentivize program spending, they decompose percent changes in program spending into two components: the percent change in program spending that is attributable to changes in revenue, and the percent change in program spending that is attributable to changes in the program spending ratio, which is the ratio of charitable expenses to total expenses. When considered together, they find that each of the two components is incrementally positively associated with changes in nonprofit executives' compensation. Aggarwal et al. (2012) extend this study by examining whether the incentive weights on the two metrics examined by Baber et al. (2002) vary by board size. Positing that 5 This shifting can persist indefinitely over time as there is no formal reconciliation of allocations among these various expense categories to the balance sheet, or to each other, over time. This differs from net income management in the for-profit setting in which net income impacts the balance sheet, and overstating net income in one period most often requires a corresponding decrease in net income in some future period. 6 Because nonprofits' activities are highly integrated, most costs are joint and therefore must be allocated across various activities. As noted by Demski (1997) , when costs are not fully separable (i.e., are joint) any allocation among activities, however reasonable, is subject to claims of arbitrariness.
smaller boards provide more effective governance, they provide both analytic and empirical evidence that incentive weights are larger for smaller boards. Frumkin and Keating (2010) focus more narrowly on donation revenues and also examine pay-for-performance sensitivity to the administrative expense ratio, the ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses. They find that the level of compensation is negatively associated with the level of the administrative expense ratio, but is not associated with the change in donation revenues.
Lastly, Brickley and Van Horn (2002) focus on nonprofit hospitals and find a positive association between changes in CEO compensation and the level of return on assets. They further examine whether proxies for the level of "altruism" provides incremental explanatory power (over return on assets) for executive compensation. They find no incremental explanatory power for their altruism proxies and conclude that there is little difference between nonprofit and for-profits in their executive compensation practices.
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Taken together, this prior research provides foundational evidence of pay-for-performance sensitivity to various aggregated accounting-based performance metrics. In the following section, we develop our hypotheses regarding incentive weights on disaggregated revenue components and on net assets, as well as hypotheses regarding cross-sectional variation in these incentive weights.
III. HYPOTHESES The Nonprofit Organizational Objective Function
Consistent with federal and state laws previously discussed, we presume that external nonprofit stakeholders and regulating agencies wish to ensure that nonprofits use their resources Unrelated Exempt Revenues are from activities that, while not related to the exempt mission, nonetheless assist in the accomplishment of the exempt mission; for example, the cafeteria in a nonprofit hospital. 9 Unrelated Taxable Revenues are revenues from activities not related to the primary exempt mission. For example, an art museum's revenues from the sale of souvenir coffee mugs labeled with the city where the museum is located is considered unrelated as the mugs are not related to the museum's tax exempt purpose of art education. Other Revenues is total nonprofit revenues less the revenues listed above. Administrative Expenses are expenses related to administrative costs. Change in Net Assets is total revenues less total expenses.
Consistent with federal and state laws previously discussed, we presume that while a nonprofit organization's primary objective function is to maximize the amount of total expenses devoted to a charitable output reported as "Program Service Expenses" on the IRS 990, they will provide incentives based on the financial metrics reflecting the provision of resources for the charitable output; namely, the various revenue sources and the accumulation of net assets.
Hypotheses

Disaggregated Revenues
Our first hypothesis, extending findings of Baber et al. (2002) and Aggarwal et al. (2012) to disaggregated components of revenues, is that nonprofit managers will be provided with an incentive to increase all sources of nonprofit revenues. This leads us to first hypothesis, stated in the alternative:
The nonprofit CEO pay-for-performance incentive weight on various revenue sources is positive.
Revenue Incentive Weight Differences Arising From Congruency
By constructing metrics based on total revenues, both Baber et al. (2002) and Aggarwal et al.
(2012) implicitly assume common incentive weight across all revenue sources. In contrast, we predict that incentive weights will vary across revenue types. Indeed, Frumkin and Keating (2010) find no incentive weights on donations in their limited sample of nonprofits. Specifically, our second hypothesis is that nonprofit revenue sources that are more congruent, or mission consistent, will be more highly incentivized. Feltham and Xie (1994) analytically demonstrate that efficient contracting requires larger incentive weights on performance metrics that are more "congruent" with firm objectives, where congruity is defined as how well the agents' actions in achieving the performance measure map into the principal's expected payoff. In the nonprofit setting a congruent revenue source is one that is more consistent, not with the principal's payoff (indeed, there is no principal), but with the achievement of the nonprofit's charitable mission.
Nonprofit organizations are required to partition their revenue sources into three categories on the IRS 990. These categories are intended to indicate the extent to which each revenue source is consistent with the charitable mission. 10 The most congruent category is "related or exempt function" revenues, and includes all revenues from "activities that form the basis of the organization's exemption from tax (IRS 990 2006) . 11 In equation (2), these revenue sources include Net Donations, Program Service Revenues, Investment Revenues, and Other Revenues.
The least congruent category is Unrelated Taxable Revenues, which are from activities that are so far removed from the organization's charitable mission that they are subject to the corporate 10 On the IRS 990 nonprofits must categorize their revenues depending on how related they are to the accomplishment of the organization's charitable mission. These categories are reported on Part VII "Income Producing Activities" on page 6 of the IRS 990. 11 Lacking any strong theoretical or regulatory guidance, we do not form predictions about which specific source of related revenues will be more strongly incentivized.
income tax. 12 The congruency of the third category, Unrelated Exempt Revenues, lies in between as these revenues are not related to the primary charitable mission, but nonetheless assist the nonprofit in the accomplishment of its charitable mission and are thus exempt by statute from the income tax. Based on this IRS ranking, our congruency hypothesis, stated in the null, is:
H2: The pay-for-performance incentive weight will be the highest on related exempt revenues, followed by unrelated exempt revenues, and will be the lowest on unrelated taxable revenues.
Change in Net Assets
The nonprofit objective function is to maximize the quantity and/or quality of its charitable output, subject to the non-distribution constraint (Hansmann 1980; Rose-Ackerman 1980 .
The non-distribution constraint implies that all revenues will be deployed toward charitable output. However, this reflects the short-term nonprofit objective and implies no accumulation of net assets (i.e., "nonprofit" in the most literal sense). Prior research and government regulators alike also recognize the nonprofit objective of long-term financial viability. Accumulated net assets not expended on charitable output in the short-term provide a source of liquidity from which a nonprofit can weather the storms of economic uncertainty and avoid bankruptcy in the long-term (Hansmann 1980; Rose-Ackerman 1980 Bowman 2002) . In addition, accumulated net assets provide funds for future capital investments that may be needed to allow the nonprofit and its charitable output to grow over time. An incentive to increase net assets in the current period is consistent with this longer-term survival and growth objective. Brickley and Van Horn (2002) provide initial evidence of a positive incentive weight on net assets (i.e., "return on assets" in that study), consistent with the notion that, on average, nonprofits forgo current charitable output in order to secure financial viability and provide for capital needs in future periods. Although Brickley and Van Horn (2002) focus narrowly on nonprofit hospitals which account for only 4 percent of all nonprofits, 13 we hypothesize that the incentive weight on net assets will be positive for all nonprofits:
H3: The pay-for-performance incentive weight on Change in Net Assets will be positive for educational, medical, and charitable nonprofits.
While H3 predicts a positive incentive weight on net assets, on average, our last two hypotheses are based on our expectation that the incentive weights on net assets will vary across nonprofits to reflect the unique economic conditions each faces. Below we develop two hypotheses that reflect our expectations regarding how the incentive weight on Change in Net Assets will vary depending on: (i) the level of "excess endowments" (Core et al. 2006 ) the nonprofit has, and (ii) future capital investment needs.
Net Asset Incentive Weight Differences Arising From Excess Endowments
While hypothesis H3 predicts that nonprofits will place positive incentive weight on net assets as a means of ensuring long-term financial viability, excessive levels of accumulated cash assets can lead to heightened agency costs, and in particular the free cash flow problem presented by Jensen (1986) . Prior research identifies cash-related agency problems in for-profit organizations. In particular, large cash balances are associated with excessive investments (Blanchard et al. 1994 ) and value-decreasing acquisitions (Harford 1999) . Hansmann (1990) theorizes that there are a number of reasons that executives of nonprofits (in particular, private universities) may amass excessive cash assets, including ensuring private benefits in the form of increased job security and lightened workload. Agency problems associated with high levels of cash assets may even be heightened in the nonprofit setting because cash holdings in nonprofits are typically larger than those of their for-profit counterparts (Hansmann 1990) , and because the absence of residual claimants reduces oversight that may mitigate the types of value-destroying activities documented in for-profit organizations (Core et al. 2006) .
Two prior studies examine agency problems associated with "free cash flows" (Frumkin and Keating (2010) and examine whether such endowments reflect (i) the anticipation of firm-specific growth opportunities, (ii) a nonprofit with superior monitoring, or (iii) a heightened agency problem.
They find that program expenditures toward charitable output are lower and officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. They conclude that the excess endowment is reflective of heightened agency problems.
In order to mitigate agency problems associated with high levels of cash-related assets, we posit that nonprofits will reduce the incentive weight on Change in Net Assets from equation 
Net Asset Incentive Weight Differences Arising From Capital Investment Needs
Nonprofit organizations do not have access to stock markets and must rely either on debt 14 Note that prior research seems to suggest that nonprofit executives are able to extract rents from the nonprofit organization in the presence of large levels of cash assets. We, however, are predicting governance mechanisms that mitigate this tendency in the form of smaller incentive weights. The implication is that the observed increases in nonprofit executive pay reflective of an exacerbated agency problem documented in prior research (i.e., Core et al. 2006 and Frumkin and Keating 2010) are lower than they otherwise would have been in the absence of the reduced incentive weight.
financing or on "capital campaigns" to accumulate the assets necessary for large capital projects.
( Bowman 2002; Hansmann 1990 
IV. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN Data
Our data are from the IRS 990 as supplied by the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI).
Compensation data included in the SOI files begins in 2000 and runs to 2007. We augment the SOI data with another database known as the "Digitized" data which gives us two additional 15 Capital campaigns typically last three years, although they can be shorter or longer. As discussed later, our results are robust to longer and shorter periods.
years of compensation data (1998 and 1999) leaving us with a final 10 year sample that runs from 1998 to 2007.
Our sample starts with all 107,888 observations with compensation data from 1998 to 2007.
We remove 209 observations with compensation above $2 million as our investigations lead us to believe that nonprofit salaries over $2 million are often the result of a coding error by the IRS. 16 Next, we remove 24,473 observations where the top paid executive is paid less than $50,000, 59 observations with less than $10,000 in total revenues, 36 with less than $10,000 in total expenses, 98 with total compensation in excess of total expenses, and 57 observations with less than $10,000 in total assets because our discussions with nonprofit compensation consulting firms suggest that incentive compensation is not commonly used for nonprofits small in size or with lower paid executives. We next removed 6,316 observations that did not provide enough detail for us to extract compensation from the various expenses or were missing industry codes in the SOI files. Next we remove 24,423 observations that reported zero fundraising expense yet reported at least $10,000 in donations as prior research suggests that these organizations are under-reporting their fundraising expenses, making it difficult for us to calculate an accurate amount of net donations (Jones and Roberts 2006; Krishnan et al. 2006; Keating et al. 2008) .
Finally, because we use a changes analysis we lose 11,743 observations, leaving us with a final analysis sample of 40,474 observations.
To control for influential observations in our empirical analysis we remove all observations with the absolute value of their studentized residuals greater than 2.0. This reduced the sample size by approximately an additional four percent, depending on the specific model used. 16 We examined most of these 209 observations and found that most of the time there was a plausible reason to doubt the accuracy of the compensation. In 23 cases the total amount of officers compensation reported on the 990 was less than the amount on the supplemental schedule (from which we get our figures). In well over 100 cases compensation was far in excess of compensation paid to the executive in any other year for that particular nonprofit. In several other cases the nonprofit had less than $2 million in total expenses. As a result, we feel it only proper to exclude these suspect observations from our analysis.
Empirical Model and Predictions
Model
Our empirical model flows from Equation (2), which is a linear representation of disaggregated revenues and expenses (reordered for presentation purposes) that, together, represent expenditure on the charitable mission: 
The descriptions of the independent variables follow directly from their respective underlying constructs, and the variable measures are collected from the IRS 990, with the specific line numbers provided in the notes in 18 We recognize that it is possible that the CEO is not necessarily the highest paid executive. To calibrate this assumption we examine a random sample of 543 observations (i.e., one percent) from the 2003 Digitized database that does specifically indicate CEO compensation. We find that the CEO was the highest paid executive for all but five of the 543 observations, suggesting that the most highly compensated executive is the CEO in slightly over 99 percent of the time. Based on this analysis we conclude that our presumption that the most highly compensation executive is the CEO is reasonable. 19 Nonprofits allocate their total officers compensation across programs, administrative, and fundraising on the form 990. We computed the ratio of total officers' compensation allocated to each area and multiplied that ratio by the amount of the chief executives compensation to arrive at the amount of chief executive compensation the nonprofit allocated to program, administrative, and fundraising expenses. The extraction of compensation from the variables of interest is a methodological improvement over prior studies that fail to take this step. Indicator and Change in Net Assets. We predict that the coefficient on the interaction will be positive.
We include a number of controls in our model. Consistent with Aggarwal et al. (2012) and Brickley and Van Horn (2002) we include the log of Total Assets from line 59b of the form 990 to control for overall nonprofit size. 21 Results are robust to substituting the log of total assets with the change in total assets or the log of total revenues. We also include 26 single digit National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) industry codes, as well as year indicators. Our results are robust to alternative rolling periods from two to four years. We use a threshold of a 28 percent increase in fixed assets in a one year period to identify a significant capital investment, although this actually represents only a net 15 percent increase in fixed assets on average as nonprofit assets in our sample depreciate (i.e., depreciation expense divided by total fixed assets) by a median of eight percent per year. The average amount of fixed assets in our sample is $34.7 million, and a 15 percent increase is thus slightly over $5 million, which appears to us to be a reasonable estimate of an average capital investment. However, our results are robust to a variety of alternative thresholds for when a capital investment is made, from a low of a five percent single period increase in fixed assets, up to a high of a 35 percent single period increase in fixed assets. 21 In the test for H4a (H4b), we include the log of total non-investment assets (log of total assets less property, plant, and equipment) to control for size, as endowments (capital investment in property, plant, and equipment) are already included in the model. In additional analyses we also included the standard deviation of each of our independent variables with no change in the inferences of our results. 22 The NTEE was established by the IRS as a means of categorizing nonprofits into 26 categories. Information related to the nomenclature can be found at http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm. of all the remaining 20 NTEE classifications (with the exception of Z, which is "unknown"). Administrative Expenses is statistically positive (at the one percent level) for the full sample, it is not statistically significant (at the one percent level) for educational nonprofits.
V. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Hypothesis H1: Disaggregated Revenues
Hypothesis H2: Disaggregated Revenues and Congruency
Hypothesis H2 predicts that the weights on the exempt revenue sources (i.e., Net Donations, Program Service Revenues, Investment Revenues, and Other Revenues) will each be larger than that on Unrelated Exempt Revenues, which in turn will be larger than that on Unrelated Taxable
Revenues. Focusing on the full sample results in Table 2 , consistent with the hypothesis we find that all four of the coefficients on the exempt revenues are statistically larger than that on Unrelated Exempt Revenues at the five percent level (with most at the one percent level).
Because the coefficient on Unrelated Taxable Revenues is not statistically different from zero, it is tempting to state that H2 is fully supported. However, although statistically insignificant on its own, the coefficient on Unrelated Taxable Revenues is not statistically different from any of the other revenue sources due to its large standard error. Despite this, we consider our tests to generally support H2 and suggest that nonprofit incentive compensation contracts are designed to more strongly incentivize more congruent revenue sources, consistent with the theoretical predictions of Feltham and Xie (1994) . 24 An interesting finding, which is not part of our formal hypotheses, is the relative strengths between Net Donations and Program Service Revenues. We find the incentive weight on
Program Service Revenues (2.031) in the full sample to be roughly three times larger than the incentive weight on Net Donations (0.727). This result could at least partially explain why nonprofits' revenue mix has changed over time, moving from one dominated by donations to one dominated by program service revenues. According to the IRS Statistics of Income (2012) program service revenues now comprise 72 percent of total revenues while donations make up only 21 percent. Some nonprofit researchers suggest that increasing reliance on program revenues has resulted in the "commercialization" of the nonprofit sector (Cordes and Weisbrod
1998; Weisbrod 1998). Our results suggest that the incentive weights in nonprofit compensation
contracts could be one cause of this increasing "commercialization."
Turning to the three industry models, we find mixed results for H2. Revenues is statistically insignificant in each of the three industry models, it is not statistically 24 Agency theory predicts, and for-profit executive compensation research generally supports, smaller incentive weights on measures that are relatively less precise (Banker and Datar 1989) . In untabulated results we also include controls for the noise in the various financial performance metrics (i.e., the time-series standard deviation), along with an interaction between each financial metric and its noise proxy. Results show decreasing weight on metrics with greater noise (i.e., less precision) consistent with prior for-profit research. Moreover, all reported results are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.
different from any of the other revenue sources due to its large standard error. To summarize our industry results, we find general, but not unanimous, support for H2.
Hypothesis H3: Change in Net Assets
Hypothesis H3 predicts that the incentive effect for the Change in Net Assets will be positive for medical, educational, and charitable nonprofits. Results in Table 2 are mixed. Consistent with the findings in Brickley and Van Horn (2002), we find a positive association between compensation and the Change in Net Assets for medical nonprofits. We also find a similar positive association for educational nonprofits. However, we find no relationship between compensation and Change in Net Assets for charitable nonprofits. This suggests that, on average, charitable nonprofits do not positively incentivize the Change in Net Assets, presumably preferring to provide additional current period charitable output.
Hypothesis H4a: Change in Net Assets and Excess Endowments
Hypothesis H4a predicts that the incentive weight placed on Change in Net Assets will be smaller in the presence of excess endowments. Results in Table 3 generally support this hypothesis. Consistent with H4a, we find for the full sample of nonprofits that the coefficient on the interaction of the Change in Net Assets and Excess Endowment is statistically negative at the one percent level. However, there is variation in this result at the nonprofit category level. We find that the incentive weight placed on Change in Net Assets is smaller in the presence of excess endowments for medical and charitable nonprofits, but not for educational nonprofits. This result provides evidence that educational nonprofits do not discourage their managers from amassing additional endowments, even when those endowments are already quite large and could result in increased agency costs.
Hypothesis H4b: Change in Net Assets and Capital Investments
Hypothesis H4b predicts that the incentive to accumulate additional net assets will be stronger in anticipation of future capital investments. Results in Table 4 generally support this hypothesis. We find that, for the full sample of nonprofits, the coefficient on the interaction of Change in Net Assets and Capital Investment is statistically positive at the one percent level. In our separate analyses of educational, medical, and charitable nonprofits we find that medical and charitable, but not educational nonprofits, reward managers for accumulating additional net assets in periods prior to a large capital investments.
The results of Hypotheses H4a and H4b suggest that educational nonprofits view the accumulation of net assets and the presence of large endowments very differently than do either medical or charitable nonprofits. Educational nonprofits do not appear to alter financial incentives in the presence of increased agency costs associated with excess endowments. In addition, these nonprofits do not increase incentives for the accumulation of net assets prior to large capital investments. In contrast, medical and charitable nonprofits respond to agency costs by reducing the incentive to earn additional current net assets in the presence of excess endowments, and increase the same incentive in anticipation of near term capital investments.
One plausible explanation for these results is that large endowments provide additional value to educational nonprofits relative to either medical or charitable nonprofits. One source of this value could be that large educational endowments provide a positive signal of the organization's quality to potential students and other donors. Still another plausible explanation is that large medical or charitable organization endowments are viewed negatively by donors. The Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance is a large charity "watchdog" that ranks charities based on a variety of characteristics, and research shows that donors respond by giving more donations to more highly ranked charities. The Bureaus' rankings specifically downgrade nonprofits with large endowments. Although the Bureau ranks many medical and charitable nonprofits, it includes no universities in its rankings, suggesting that the costs of alienating potential donors are particularly high for medical and charitable nonprofits.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This study examines the extent to which nonprofit CEO compensation is associated with accounting-based performance metrics. Specifically, we disaggregate total revenues into its constituent components of donations, program service revenues (from the sales of products and services), interest revenues, other revenues, unrelated exempt revenues (tax-exempt revenues from side-business activities), and unrelated taxable revenues (taxable revenues from sidebusiness activities). We find that managers are incentivized to increase all revenue sources with the exception of unrelated taxable revenues, and that the incentive weights statistically vary consistent with differences in performance measure congruence. Specifically, we find the largest incentive weights for revenues that are comparatively more congruent with the charitable mission (i.e., donations and program service revenues), and the smallest incentive weights for the least congruent forms of revenues (i.e., unrelated exempt revenues and unrelated taxable revenues). These results provide the first evidence that nonprofit incentive compensation schemes reflect differences in performance measure congruence consistent with predictions of agency theory (i.e., Feltham and Xie 1994) .
We also show that, on average, nonprofits place positive incentive weight on net assets (the nonprofit analog of net income), reflecting an objective to forego current expenditure on charitable output in order to secure financial viability and provide for capital needs in future periods. As predicted, however, we show that incentive weights on net assets vary across nonprofits to reflect the unique economic conditions each faces. Specifically, we show decreased weights for nonprofits with excessive endowments, and increased weights for nonprofits with subsequent significant capital expenditures.
Our study extends prior research in several important ways. We are the first study to disaggregate total revenues into its various components, as well as to test for differences in incentive weights across revenue sources consistent with Feltham and Xie's (1994) construct of performance measure congruity. In addition, we push the nonprofit compensation literature forward by more carefully and more comprehensively examining nonprofit incentive weights placed on net assets. This is an important line of inquiry because of the complex role that net assets play in the nonprofit setting; specifically, increased net assets serve to secure the financial future of the nonprofit, but at the expense of current spending on charitable spending.
Several limitations of this study should be taken into consideration. First, like prior studies we use program expenses as a proxy for the true nonprofit objective, which is to maximize the quality and quantity of charitable output. We recognize that dollars spent does not necessarily equate to charitable output, as productivity varies across time and organizations. We also recognize that we do not examine quality of that output. Nonfinancial productivity measures can more directly assess charitable output, but these measures are often not observable and vary widely across nonprofit industries. Thus, we settle for program spending as a measureable, though suboptimal, proxy for nonprofit objectives and examine incentive weights on the financial metrics, revenues and increases in net assets, which reflect resources provided for program spending. Second, the nature of the Form 990 that serves as the source of our data limits our analysis to total compensation (including retirement contributions and benefits) and precludes our ability to separately identify incentive compensation (e.g., bonus) specifically.
Indeed, compared to the for-profit setting, nonprofit compensation data is primitive.
Our findings are consistent with our discussions with nonprofit compensation consultants, most of who indicated that the use of certain revenue-based accounting measures in incentive design is common. However, absent data on formal written contracts, we cannot conclude with certainty that accounting-based performance measures are explicitly used in nonprofit incentive contracts. This, however, is true of much of the for-profit CEO compensation literature, which predominantly uses the implicit approach that we employ. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study provides additional insights regarding incentive contracting at the executive level in nonprofit organizations, insights that can inform future nonprofit and for-profit compensation research. Table 1 . The dependent variable is the ∆ Compensation, where ∆ represents the oneyear change. All variables are yearly changes scaled by prior period total revenues. All models include year and NTEE single industry indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered at the nonprofit level, and t-statistics are presented under the related coefficient estimates. *, ** = statistically different from zero at least at the five, one percent level, two-tailed.
